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Abstract: In the current media environment of growing information disorder and social 
media platforms emerging as primary news sources, the creation and spread of disin‑
formation is becoming increasingly easy and cost ‑effective. The projection of strategic 
narratives through disinformation campaigns is an important geopolitical tool in the 
global competition for power and status. We have analysed close to 1,000 individual 
news pieces from more than 60 different online sources containing disinformation, which 
originally appeared in one of the V4 languages, using a natural language processing 
algorithm. We have assessed the frequency of recurring themes within the articles and 
their relationship structure, to see whether consistent disinformation narratives were 
to be found among them. Through frequency analysis and relationship charting, we 
have been able to uncover individual storylines connected to more than ten overarching 
disinformation narratives. We have also exposed five key meta ‑narratives present in all 
Visegrád Countries, which fed into a coherent system of beliefs, such as the envisioned 
collapse of the European Union or the establishment of a system of Neo ‑Atlantism, 
which would permanently divide the continent.
Key words: novel technologies, geopolitics, disinformation, strategic narratives, 
Visegrád Group
Introduction
Political polarisation, opinion echo chambers and filter bubbles seem to have 
become the buzzwords of the past years, not only in the political conversation 
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but also within the popular discourse. The widespread interest in documenta‑
ries such as ‘The Social Dilemma’ (Orlowski 2020), a movie premiered in 2020 
that takes a critical look at technology platforms influencing human behaviour, 
showcases the simultaneous fascination and concern over political and social 
trends enhanced by digital technologies increasingly shaping our realities. The 
Oxford English Dictionary chose the word post ‑truth as the word of the year in 
2016 (OUP 2016). The selection seeks to represent the ‘ethos, mood, or preoc‑
cupations of a particular year’ that has ‘lasting potential as a word of cultural 
significance’ (OUP 2020). The term post ‑truth has gone from being a peripheral 
term to a widely recognised notion in headlines, publications and the cultural 
mainstream within the course of a year, largely in relation to the Brexit referen‑
dum in the United Kingdom and the 2016 United States presidential elections, 
with the most important association of the term being post ‑truth politics. The 
‘post’ prefix in the expression ‘post ‑truth’ articulates the meaning of truth as 
a concept becoming unimportant, dated or irrelevant in the contemporary 
political context (ibid.).
Critics of data ‑centric technologies claimed more than a decade ago that ideo‑
logical silos (Sunstein 2007) could be created through growing personalisation 
powered by digital technologies. The increasing authority of the consumer to 
filter what kind of information they encounter on a daily basis has the potential 
to skew people’s perceptions regarding tendencies in news and public affairs. 
Simple search engine results can vary by personal and regional (location ‑bound) 
characteristics, while social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter or Reddit 
operate custom newsfeeds to enhance user experience. Internet users – through 
algorithmic decision ‑making and as a result of personal network connections – 
increasingly only encounter information that does not challenge their original 
beliefs but typically reinforces their pre ‑existing convictions (EPRS 2019a). 
Such digitally enabled distortion of shared realities can result in voices gradu‑
ally becoming more radical.
This leads us to the so ‑called (social media) echo chamber phenomenon or the 
emergence of homophilic clusters of individuals who reinforce and amplify each 
other’s opinions, creating a bubble where no opinion challenge can occur (Garret 
2009). Echo chambers can come to life thanks to the human tendency to seek 
information adhering to pre ‑existing opinions and values, generally referred to 
as an unconscious exercise of confirmation bias. Confirmation bias is the human 
tendency to seek information that one considers supportive of their favoured 
hypotheses or existing beliefs, and to simultaneously interpret information in 
ways that are partial to those (Nickerson 1998). Such selective exposure to opin‑
ions and the (self‑)isolation from a diverse range of arguments naturally pushes 
people toward more extreme attitudes (Sunstein 2007). Polarisation of views 
may account for growing partisan divides among political affiliations and ever 
greater ideological gaps being created within society (ibid.). Social media network 
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dynamics therefore play a crucial role in influencing political processes as social 
platforms have become the agorae of not only political campaigning but also of 
sharing information (EPRS 2019a). According to Sunstein (2007: 8–9), the grow‑
ing power of consumers to filter what they see and hear decreases the probability 
of unplanned, unanticipated encounters that constitute shared experiences in an 
otherwise heterogenous society. If such tendencies exceed a certain threshold, they 
could inhibit the creation of a general consensus on core questions that are central 
to addressing social problems and the functioning of democracy itself (ibid.).
Although the extent to which consumer selection and algorithmic decision‑
‑making respectively contribute to the creation of social media echo chambers 
and filter bubbles is still debated in the literature, we find ourselves in a chicken‑
‑and ‑egg situation where regardless of the exact structure of causalities, the 
human ‑machine interaction seems to create a mutually reinforcing dynamic. 
Zimmer and others (2019) make a point about human accountability when 
they argue that algorithms and their mechanisms to form filter bubbles, do 
not create online communities on their own, but rather amplify users’ exist‑
ing behaviours. They reflect on cognitive patterns, such as non ‑argumentative 
or off ‑topic behaviour, denial, moral outrage, meta ‑comments, insults, satire 
and creation of a new rumour that could all contribute to the emergence of 
echo chambers. John and Dvir ‑Gvirsam (2015) also point to the human factor, 
when presenting empirical evidence that politically motivated unfriending on 
Facebook became a common practice in the Israel ‑Gaza conflict of 2014. Such 
ideologically ‑based unfriending affected weak ties in the network, which are 
precisely those connections that would with a higher probability expose users to 
a diverse range of opinions. On the other hand, Cinelli et. al. (2021), by analys‑
ing the interactions of more than one million active users on Facebook, Twitter, 
Reddit and Gab, have concluded that while the former two platforms presented 
clear ‑cut echo chambers, the latter two did not, suggesting that different plat‑
forms offer different interaction paradigms to users, triggering different social 
dynamics. Particularly, platforms organised around social networks and news 
feed algorithms, seem to favour the emergence of echo chambers (ibid.). Cohen 
(2018) makes a similar observation, stating that algorithm ‑based personalised 
feeds create an immersive media environment that permits users to consume 
unique media feeds that may affect civic actions and democracy by tailoring 
cultural artefacts to the individual user. Irrespective of the exact share of human 
and machine bias in the equation, as automation and algorithms become more 
embedded in civic life, we have to assess the role of technology in deepening 
social divides and how we might be able to counter undesirable tendencies 
(EPRS 2019a). Responding to the effects of social media enabled polarisation 
could entail a top ‑down approach of interrogating digital media structures, 
platform capitalism, algorithm design and methods of data collection, as well 
as a bottom ‑up move from the consumers’ perspective, to transition beyond 
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traditional media literacy, understanding the multiple ways user actions are 
converted into algorithmic decision ‑making (Cohen 2018).
Computational propaganda and disinformation campaigns
Not long ago, most academic research and public attention on cyber power fo‑
cused on the possibilities of affecting the physical world via digital threats, such 
as cybercrime, data theft or damage to critical infrastructure. Today computa‑
tional propaganda is gradually taking centre stage (Bradshaw – Howard 2018). 
Computational propaganda as defined by Howard and Woolley (2016:4886) is 
‘the assemblage of social media platforms, autonomous agents, and big data 
tasked with the manipulation of public opinion’. The blueprint of computational 
propaganda entails autonomous agents acting based on big data collected on 
people’s behaviour in order to advance certain ideological projects. Compu‑
tational propaganda, therefore, can be regarded as a technical strategy to use 
information technology for social control (ibid.). Cases such as the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal have shown the vulnerabilities of social platforms and how 
their business model could be exploited in order to manipulate citizens (EPRS 
2019a). Computational propaganda, as known from everyday life, includes the 
spread of disinformation, automated amplification with bots and fake accounts, 
the suppression of opposition with hate speech and trolling and the infiltration 
of political groups and events (ibid.). Social media manipulation is already avail‑
able to a large proportion of internet users at relatively low costs; however, as 
innovations in artificial intelligence, machine learning and big data analytics 
advance, weapons of computational propaganda will become even more effec‑
tive and sophisticated (Bradshaw – Howard 2018).
Current levels of online mis‑ and disinformation, commonly described as 
‘fake news’, already pose serious threats to the workings of democracy by cast‑
ing a shadow of doubt on democratic election outcomes. With that said we have 
to point out that we still lack a thorough understanding on how much impact 
computational propaganda has on actual voter behaviour. Recent examples 
of disinformation campaigns undermining public trust and impeding the for‑
mation of a general consensus on election outcomes include the UK Brexit 
referendum and the 2016 United States presidential elections (EPRS 2019b), 
which shows that the actual or perceived effects of computational propaganda 
are already manifesting themselves in real life outcomes.
In order to maintain clarity of terminology, it is important to distinguish 
between distinct categories of information disorder used in computational 
propaganda, and define mis‑, dis‑ and malinformation, instead of vaguely re‑
ferring to them collectively as ‘fake news’. According to the classification used 
by Wardle and Derakhshan (2017: 5), differences among the three categories 
are to be found along the dimensions of intention to cause harm and falseness of 
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information. As stated by their definition, misinformation refers to false infor‑
mation being shared, where no harm was meant, while disinformation refers to 
false information being shared knowingly, with the precise intention to cause 
harm. Conversely, malinformation refers to genuine information being shared to 
intentionally cause harm, by spreading private information in the public space. 
The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS 2019b: 1) has identified 
five key drivers behind the rapid and pervasive spread of online mis‑ and dis‑
information campaigns in recent years:
• Online propaganda and for ‑profit websites that specifically spread disin‑
formation with the goal of deepening societal divides and influencing 
political outcomes based on a particular ideological stance.
• Post ‑truth politics, whereby politicians and political parties propagate 
misleading claims to frame key public issues in a way that is beneficial 
politically, ignoring factual evidence.
• Partisan media and poor ‑quality journalism, which is aimed at feeding echo 
chambers, by using highly divisive language and partisan reporting, often 
overlooking factual inaccuracies.
• Polarised crowds created through personal selection of content and ex‑
trapolated by algorithmic decision ‑making, which are characterised by 
biased content sharing and the creation of hyper ‑partisan groups.
• Technological particularities of advertising algorithms and the business 
model of social platforms, which can contribute to the promotion of on‑
line misinformation through search engine optimisation, personalised 
social feeds and the monetisation of micro ‑targeted advertising.
Online misinformation and disinformation are not limited to Facebook and 
Twitter, but affect all social media platforms and even mobile applications, with 
the most prominent ones being YouTube, Reddit, 4Chan, 8Chan, WhatsApp, 
Discord and Telegram (EPRS 2019b). The logic of the disinformation lifecycle is 
built around a self ‑reinforcing dynamic, whereby the creation and propagation 
of disinformation is supported through intentional amplification strategies. 
Successful disinformation campaigns tend to build on the emotive power of 
stories and images that have the capacity to invoke an emotional response in 
readers and boost online engagement. Disinformation campaigns often aim to 
harness the power of a network of websites that post similar distortive content 
to reinforce each other and enhance credibility. The impact of disinformation 
is ensured by its ‘shareability factor’ on social media, meaning that the content 
by itself has the ability to become trending due to its sensationalist or emotion‑
ally charged nature. Such targeted disinformation news pieces typically play on 
social divisions, such as political or religious beliefs and include digital elements 
that increase visibility and engagement through the use of memes, false images, 
false footage and misleading content (ibid.).
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Along with genuine propagation, artificial amplification and spread of disin‑
formation through fake profiles and groups also play a crucial role in heighten‑
ing perceived importance. Artificial propagation of content can include the use 
of bots, trolls, sockpuppets or even simple targeted advertisements (Bastos – 
Mercea 2018). Bots are automatic posting protocols that scrape data from inter‑
net sources and post them via social media platforms to artificially inflate the 
popularity of certain content. Trolls are (semi ‑automated) supervised accounts, 
commonly understood as hostile, malign actors on social media, who promote 
extremist opinions, disseminate fake news or distort conversations. Sockpup‑
pets are fictitious online identities used to manipulate public opinion through 
deception (ibid.). The wide spectrum of coordinated inauthentic behaviour on 
social platforms serves the purpose of steering and shaping public conversation 
in a desired way. Astroturfing, in particular, is a technique to mimic grass ‑roots 
initiatives in online communities to create the appearance of a genuine group 
of people who provide credibility to a certain cause. Such fake groups are used 
to lure unsuspecting users, who will be presented information that purposefully 
distort facts to fit specific narratives, display a biased view of events or even 
express a specific call to action (Kovic et al. 2018).
Disinformation and strategic narratives in the V4 region
Successful disinformation campaigns are often targeted at existing societal 
grievances and fissures to create discord among the members of a group or so‑
ciety (Jankowicz 2020). Storytelling, based on narratives coloured by emotions, 
has great potential to incite certain group behaviour, create new social identities 
and drive polarisation (Rosůlek 2018). Miskimmon et. al. (2013) argue that the 
study of strategic narratives is necessary in the novel media environment to 
understand complexities of international politics. Discursive framing of local, 
regional and global occurrences can determine who gets to construct the expe‑
rience of international events (ibid:103). Livingston et al. (2018) also argue that 
a strategic narratives framework is key to capturing the complexities and pur‑
poses of transnational struggles over meaning. The study of strategic narratives 
has been applied to wide ‑reaching topics from analysing public support for the 
deployment of military troops by national governments (Ringsmose – Børgesen 
2011; Dimitriu – de Graaf 2016; Coticchia – De Simone 2016), mitigating the 
effects of climate change (Bushell et al. 2017; Bevan et al. 2020), construing the 
international system from emerging countries’ perspective (van Noort 2017) and 
even in the realm of business, regarding how managers can construct future‑
‑oriented narratives for companies (Kaplan – Orlikowski 2014; Bonchek 2016).
Purposeful deception and disinformation campaigns in the international 
media space can be effective through the use of narratives, because engaged au‑
diences become willing but unaware collaborators who help achieve fraudulent 
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campaigners’ goals (Bastos – Mercea 2018). When analysing disinformation 
campaigns in the V4 region, we have decided to focus on recurring narratives 
and meta ‑narratives potentially emerging from individual disinformation news 
pieces in order to distil information that could be considered supportive of 
a coherent system of beliefs or a certain world view. We know that the Visegrád 
Group has managed to profile itself internationally as a significant collective 
actor, both through its individual member states being NATO and EU members 
and the group itself, as a region that holds increased geopolitical importance 
from a perspective of security, primarily in the energy sector and recently also 
in cyber security (Cabada – Waisová 2018). This gives reason to believe that the 
Visegrád Group and its member states could be worthy targets of disinformation 
campaigns aimed at manipulating public opinion. When seeking out inherent 
strategic narratives in disinformation news pieces targeted at the region, we 
relied on Miskimmon and others’ (2013) definition on identifying constructed 
identity claims and articulated positions on specific issues that seek to shape 
perceptions and actions of domestic and international audiences.
Recent studies conducted on disinformation campaigns in the countries of 
the V4 region and beyond have used a similar framework when assessing the role 
of narratives communicated. Deverell et al. (2020) have conducted a compara‑
tive narrative analysis on how the news platform Sputnik narrated Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden between 2014 and 2019, and have found that 
Sputnik News utilised a mix of standard strategies and tailor ‑made narratives 
to destruct Nordic countries. They have been able to identify differences among 
how Sputnik narrated the countries of the region, with Sweden and Denmark 
being portrayed more negatively than Norway and Finland. They have concluded 
that the identified narratives served the purpose of dividing and weakening the 
Nordics and the EU, as well as undermining the international reputation of the 
countries involved. A Izak (2019) has focused on the presentation of the Euro‑
pean Union in Slovak pro ‑Kremlin media, with the main objective of identify‑
ing basic narratives via qualitative discourse analysis, and has concluded that 
media manipulation regarding the image of the EU could be considered a tool in 
a broader scheme of hybrid warfare. Wenerski (2017) examined disinformation 
campaigns as a method of creating geopolitical influence by distorting public 
perception of people, events and even entire institutions such as the EU or the 
NATO. Wenerski argues that an alternative version of events at the Euromaidan, 
the war in Donbas and Syria has been created by disinformation sources that 
seek to destabilise the local political situation by supporting one political side 
and simultaneously discrediting the other. Kuczyńska ‑Zonik and Tatarenko 
(2019) have studied the problem of information security and propaganda in 
Central and Eastern European countries since 2000, and have concluded that 
information war in the CEE region is not directed toward the countries of the 
region but rather aims to weaken the West, especially the European Union. 
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Hinck et al. (2018) examined strategic narratives embedded in Russian broad‑
cast and news media, by analysing 1016 broadcast and online news segments 
from 17 different sources representing governmental and official news sites, 
oppositional sites and independent news sources. They have found that nar‑
ratives help construct Russian identity in building domestic cohesion while 
fending off criticisms by Western nations. Khaldarova (2016) has concluded 
that Russia employed strategic narratives to construct activities, themes and 
messages in a compelling story line during its conflict with Ukraine. She also 
identified differences in narratives on Russian television when broadcasted to 
domestic and foreign audiences.
Hypotheses
Based on the examined literature – especially Deverell et al. (2020), Hinck et al. 
(2018) and Khaldarova (2016) – our first hypothesis for the analysis was that 
among disinformation news pieces targeted at the Visegrád countries, we would 
be able to identify recurring topics, and that based on these key topics it would 
be possible to establish prevailing narratives and meta ‑narratives of disinforma‑
tion campaigns targeted at the V4 region. A topic would be considered recurring 
based on its relative frequency of mentions and its overarching presence in 
various or all four datasets. Our second hypothesis was that if so – similarly to 
Izak (2019), Kuczyńska ‑Zonik and Tatarenko (2019) and Wenerski (2017) – we 
would be able to structure those narratives and meta ‑narratives into a coherent 
system that portrays an underlying logic or world view.
Data and methodology
In order to investigate potential disinformation campaigns directed at the 
V4 region, we have gathered and analysed close to one thousand individual 
disinformation news pieces from over 60 different sources collected from the 
EUvsDisinfo Database (EUvsDisinfo 2020a). This database is an open ‑source 
repository that has been created by and is under the curatorship of the EUvs‑
Disinfo Project, established in 2015 by the European Union External Action 
Service’s East StratCom Task Force. The East StratCom Task Force supports EU 
efforts at strengthening the media environment, particularly in the Eastern 
Partnership region of the Union, by publishing reports and analyses regarding 
disinformation trends affecting the European Union and its Member States 
(EEAS 2018). The EUvsDisinfo Project has the core objective of exposing disin‑
formation narratives and media manipulation, with special focus on messages 
in the international information space that are identified as ‘providing a partial, 
distorted, or false depiction of reality’ (EUvsDisinfo 2020b). Although the aim 
of the EUvsDisinfo Project is to increase public awareness particularly around 
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misleading content that could be classified as disseminating pro ‑Kremlin disin‑
formation narratives, it is important to note that their selection of news pieces 
‘does not imply, that a given news outlet is linked to the Kremlin or editorially 
pro ‑Kremlin or that it has intentionally sought to disinform’ (ibid.). Within the 
scope of our analysis, we have accepted the classification used by the EUvsDis‑
info Database in determining whether a certain news piece contained disinfor‑
mation, and have not performed further evaluation regarding the accuracy of 
claims presented in the articles.1 
The EUvsDisinfo Database (EUvsDisinfo 2020a) is compiled through media 
monitoring performed in 15 different languages and is updated on a weekly ba‑
sis. At the time of the retrieval of the data2, the Database contained more than 
10,000 pieces of individual news items, with 943 news pieces that originally 
appeared in one of the V4 languages. The collection included 458 Czech, 285 
Polish, 160 Hungarian and 40 Slovak language articles that appeared between 
January of 2015 and November of 2020, which we have retrieved and saved for 
the purpose of our analysis. The news pieces were originally compiled from 
more than 60 different online sources (predominantly news sites and blogs), 
with the majority of the articles originating from Sputnik News Czech Republic, 
American European News (Czech Republic), Sputnik News Poland, News Front 
Hungary and Zem & Vek (Slovakia). The rationale behind selecting news pieces 
that first appeared in one of the V4 languages was to identify pieces of disinfor‑
mation that were specifically targeted at the internet users of the V4 countries. 
Although there are limitations to that assumption, as news pieces published in 
other widely spoken second languages in the region – for example English or 
German – could also be targeted towards V4 countries, it is a reasonable assump‑
tion to part from that those news pieces that were originally published in one of 
the four languages were the ones that have been specifically directed towards V4 
readers. By retrieving the 943 news items, we have created our own database, 
which contained the publication date of the articles, the original language of 
publication, the titles of the articles, the URL or place of publication and the 
summary of the contents of each news item. Both the titles of the articles and 
1 The EUvsDisinfo Database is compiled through professional systematic media monitoring services, 
covering different channels of communication and a wide array of news outlets, particularly but not 
exclusively focusing on sources that are external to the EU and might spread key pro -Kremlin messages. 
In accordance with the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation (EC 2016), disinformation is defined as 
verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain 
or to intentionally deceive the public. Verifying the falseness of information listed in the database is 
performed on a case -by -case basis, in which the editors of the database include a ‘disproofs’ section to 
each news item that explains the components that make a certain claim disinformation, using publicly 
available official documents and statements, academic reports and studies, findings of fact -checkers and 
reporting of international media. To ensure provability, links are provided to the original disinformation 
messages and their archived versions (EUvsDisinfo 2020c).
2 The data was retrieved between the 5th and 17th of November from the EUvsDisinfo (2020a) online 
database.
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the summary of contents were provided in English language in the repository, 
which we have used for the purpose of our analysis.
In order to perform content analysis on such a large amount of natural 
language data, we have used a Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithm3 
to extract information and categorise recurring topics within the individual 
news pieces. The use of NLP algorithms in (political) discourse analysis and 
specifically misinformation campaigns or ‘fake news’ is a field within social 
sciences that has been gaining increased attention in recent years. Zhou et al. 
(2019) have found that the explosive growth of fake news and its erosive effect 
on democracy make the study of misinformation an interdisciplinary topic, 
which requires joint expertise in computer and information science, political 
science, journalism, social science, psychology and economics. They have ap‑
proached the problem from the perspective of news content and information 
in social networks, techniques in data mining, machine learning, natural lan‑
guage processing, information retrieval and social search to devise a holistic 
and automatic tool for the detection of fake news. Ibrishimova and Li (2020) 
have likewise used a framework for fake news detection based on a machine 
learning model to define and automate the detection process of fake news. 
Díaz ‑García et al. (2020) have presented a solution based on Text Mining that 
identified text patterns related to Twitter tweets that refer to fake news, using 
a pre ‑labelled dataset of fake and real tweets during the United States presiden‑
tial election of 2016. Oshikawa et al. (2018) have highlighted the importance 
of NLP solutions for fake news detection, notwithstanding limitations and 
challenges involved, given the massive amount of web content produced daily. 
Farrell (2019) has utilised natural language processing and approximate string 
matching on a large collection of data to examine the relationship between the 
large ‑scale climate misinformation movement and philanthropy. Rashkin et al. 
(2017) have compared the language of real news with that of satire, hoaxes 
and propaganda to find linguistic characteristics of untrustworthy text using 
computational linguistics. Aletras et al. (2016) have built a predictive model 
based on natural language processing and machine learning to unveil patterns 
driving judicial decisions in the European Court of Human Rights cases, based 
solely on textual content.
After examining analytical methods utilised in the cited literature, we decided 
to perform a text mining exercise on our database containing all 943 news items. 
We instructed the NLP algorithm to return the individual frequency of mentions 
of recurring topics and their relationship structure, based on co ‑mentions. We 
performed this exercise, both on an overall V4 and an individual country ‑level, 
3 The NLP solution used for our analysis is a proprietary algorithm designed by Neticle Plc. with unique 
language capabilities to understand text data with human -level precision. More information on the NLP 
solution is available at the Zurvey.io online platform.
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for the datasets of the four languages. The frequency analysis method helped us 
unify insights and uncover tendencies and outliers in the datasets. To optimise 
search results, we manually incorporated theme ‑specific expressions and key‑
words into the NLP algorithm, and created custom queries to search for specific 
themes within the textual data. We used data ‑labelling connected to the custom 
queries to establish categories among the recurring topics, to group them into 
distinct subject matters and compare their relative frequency among the data‑
sets of the four countries. Some custom queries required only a few keywords 
to maximise search accuracy (e.g., in the case of a renowned person’s name), 
while some other themes appeared in the news articles in various and often 
imprecise contexts. In these cases, relevant expressions had to be collected and 
incorporated into the NLP algorithm manually, as mentioned above.
 
Table 1: Categories and custom queries created for the algorithmic analysis






Russian Federation Russia, Moscow, Kremlin




Eastern Ukraine and Crimea Eastern Ukraine, Donetsk, Donbass, Luhansk, Crimea, Crimean
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nagorno
Concept
Information War disinformation, fake news, information war, hybrid war, propaganda, fake news, hybrid threat
Gas Market gas, pipeline, Nord Stream, LNG, energy, Gazprom
Organisation
EU EU, Schengen, EP, Brussels, European Council, European Parliament, European Union, Council of 
Europe
Deep State deep state, global capital, shadow state, shadow government
CIA CIA, Central Intelligence Agency, American Intelligence Agency, American foreign intelligence
Event
MH17 MH17, Boeing, Crash, MH-17
Brexit Brexit
Ideology, Belief
Russophobia anti-Russian, Russophobia, anti-Russia, against Russia, against Slavs, anti-Slav, war with Russia
Bolshevism Bolshevism, Bolshevik
Source: Own elaboration
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As seen in Table 1., we have ordered the queries into seven main categories 
according to their context of use within the articles. The defined categories 
were: Person; Country; Geographic location; Concept; Organisation; Event; 
and Ideology, Belief. We must highlight that the categorisation of themes and 
keywords used for the custom queries within the scope of this study have been 
established exclusively based on their fit with the original language used in 
the articles, in order to optimise search results and uncover their frequency of 
mentions. Accordingly, categories and keywords used do not represent a state‑
ment of value or opinion in any way, but merely serve analytical purposes. The 
context of certain expressions and synonyms used within the articles predefined 
how these same expressions could be identified algorithmically within the 
analysed texts. For example, countries tended to be represented as individual 
actors, and as such, were often referred to by their capital city (e.g., ‘Berlin’ in 
order to denote Germany) or iconic place (e.g., ‘White House’ to refer to the 
United States). Similarly, geographic locations (e.g., Europe) were often used 
interchangeably with an acting organisation (e.g., the European Union). In 
order to resolve this inconsistency, we created two separate categories: ‘Coun‑
try’ and ‘Geographic location’. In the former, we listed themes that referred to 
countries as actors in the international arena, while in the latter we compiled 
locations where particular events have taken place. ‘Organisation’ by itself is 
a dual category, as the articles tended to refer to both legitimate international 
organisations, such as NATO and unclear actors such as the ‘Deep State’ in an 
equally axiomatic way. Therefore, in order to maintain the logic of the analysis, 
we had to include these qualitatively different concepts under the same cat‑
egory, as an organisation or group of people independently acting within the 
international space. In certain cases, we had to accept loose wording among 
synonyms for the queries to find relevant mentions in the text, as, for example, 
the European Union as an acting entity has been referred to in the articles in 
various ways, from ‘Schengen’ to ‘Brussels’ and ‘EP’; of course, these denomina‑
tions technically cannot be considered correct terms for representing the EU; 
however, from specific textual contexts, their intended meaning was clear. Such 
ambiguities in wording within the queries performed – some of which have also 
been listed above – are entirely attributed to using wording from the articles for 
the sake of finding relevant mentions within the data. Certain categorisations 
may seem arbitrary as global events, such as the Cold War in specific contexts 
could also be considered a concept rather than an event (e.g., ‘Cold War logic’). 
Conversely, Crimea, primarily a geographic location, could be paraphrased as 
an event (e.g., ‘the Crimean crisis’). Perhaps the most controversial ones are 
the themes within the ‘Ideology, Belief’ category as they include both religious 
beliefs (e.g., Islam), sentiments (e.g., Russophobia) and political ideologies 
(e.g., ‘Nazism’) that are difficult to delineate precisely. It is important to note 
that the reason for creating a categorisation of themes was primarily to be able 
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to perform comparative analysis on their frequency of mention, and uncover 
hidden trends within and between datasets. For this purpose, we have decided 
to use the predominant textual contexts of themes as they originally appeared 
in the articles, without evaluating other possible interpretations of wordings 
that were not relevant for the scope of our analysis.
Results and discussion
To establish recurring narratives and uncover outliers among the results re‑
turned by the NLP algorithm, we first looked at the distribution and frequency 
of mentions of the seven categories. We found that the category Country among 
the seven main categories showed overwhelming frequency both on a V4 aver‑
age and an individual country level. On an overall V4 level, news items featur‑
ing countries made up 79% of the selection, showing a strong bias towards 
narratives that depict countries as main actors in the international arena and 
personifying nation states as entities that have their own will and act on their 
own motivation. The second category in terms of frequency on a V4 level was 
Organisation, with 37% of mentions, followed by Concept with 30%, Geographic 
location at 26%, Ideologies and Beliefs at 22%, Person at 15% and Event at 14%. 
Please note that the sum of individual category frequencies exceeds one hundred 
percent, as naturally there were co ‑mentions in the text among the different 
categories. By contrasting the frequency of mentions of the different categories 
among the four datasets, we were able to identify where we should look for 
discrepancies, as an excess or lack of mentions of a certain topic. Based on the 
outliers in data, we could identify both common themes and country ‑specific 
differences regarding narratives unfolding from the articles. We ordered our 
investigation around narratives pertinent to the seven main categories, moving 
from the most significant category in terms of frequency of mentions, which 
was Country, to the least cited one, Event.
News articles corresponding to the Country category made up 73–76% of 
the selection for Hungarian, Czech and Slovak language items respectively, 
while 92% of Polish language articles contained country ‑related mentions. 
The distribution of specific countries mentioned within the different datasets 
showed some commonalities but also considerable differences. Among country 
mentions for all V4 countries, we found both Russia and the United States in 
the top ‑three of countries cited for every data set, with numerous co ‑mentions 
of the two countries. Narratives concerning Russia showed significant com‑
monalities in the four countries. The predominant narrative was not regarding 
Russia’s strength or grandeur but rather depicting Russia as a victim of Rus‑
sophobia and unfounded aggression originating both from its western neigh‑
bouring countries, and, most importantly, directed from the United States. We 
found that the majority of news articles described the deterioration of relations 
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between Russia and the US, the EU, Poland, the Baltic States and Ukraine. The 
articles were mostly concerned with speculative American interests in reinstat‑
ing Cold War ‑like circumstances, where Russia would become economically, po‑
litically and ideologically isolated from the West. The underlying argument was 
two ‑fold: both economic interests and ideological animosity between the two 
powers were identified. The mentioned economic interests involved European 
defence industry purchases from US suppliers and the promotion of Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) imported to Europe from the United States. According to the 
identified narrative, this entails pushing Russia out of the European gas market 
and obstructing the Nord Stream 2 project, a system of offshore natural gas 
pipelines connecting Russia with Germany. The ideological hostility, as stated 
by the news pieces, manifests itself in attempts to defame Russia by fuelling 
anti ‑Russian sentiment through disseminating fake information.
The main focus of supposed western disinformation campaigns against Rus‑
sia involved the Skripal and Navalny cases, insinuating Russian involvement in 
the United States presidential elections and re ‑writing or falsifying Second World 
War history in a way that depicts Russia as an aggressor. Narratives identified 
from the articles concerning Russia were overarching for all V4 countries; 
however, differences could be found in the frequency of mentions among them 
on a country ‑to ‑country basis. For example, the narrative regarding the falsifi‑
cation of WWII history was particularly strong among Polish language articles, 
where more than 50 articles of the 285 analysed occurred with such mentions, 
compared to a total of 8 articles in the other three languages combined. The 
articles claimed that the liberation of Poland by the Red Army is being increas‑
ingly narrated as an invasion by contemporary Polish politicians who actively 
Table 2: Frequency of mentions of the seven main categories on an individual 

















Country 92 74 75 73 79
Organisation 29 36 50 41 37
Concept 21 33 20 36 30
Geographic location 22 37 15 26 26
Ideology, Belief 30 17 23 19 22
Person 12 13 8 19 15
Event 27 12 3 9 14
Source: Own elaboration
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serve US interests. Furthermore, the articles stated that Red Army monuments 
in Poland were at threat of being vandalised or destroyed as a sign of growing 
Russophobia in the country. Comparatively, in the Hungarian language articles 
concerning Russia, country ‑specific emphasis was on the instances of Ukrain‑
ian aggression towards Russia and the Navalny case, as a theoretically CIA ‑led 
operation to sabotage Russian access to the European gas market through the 
provocation of economic sanctions. Czech and Slovak language articles fre‑
quently featured alleged FBI and CIA involvement in manipulating local media 
to spread anti ‑Russian sentiment with particular focus on the Skripal case.
Examining the articles mentioning the United States, we were also able to 
uncover a consistent geopolitical strategy narrative present in all four datasets. 
To a varying degree, the articles conveyed that the United States is gradually 
preparing to engage in economic warfare or even armed conflict with the Rus‑
sian Federation in order to eliminate its rival and eventually gain access to Rus‑
sia’s natural resources. The United States, theoretically, is increasing its political 
influence, secret service operations and military presence in Europe, particularly 
in the Eastern and Baltic States. According to the related narrative, the US is 
actively supporting the creation of a North ‑South belt of federal states between 
Germany and the Russian Federation, which would be both anti ‑Russian and 
Eurosceptic. This would divide spheres of influence between the West and the 
East, and restrict both the expansion of Russia and the creation of a strong and 
united Europe. The tools for achieving this goal, according to the news pieces, 
range from underground operations of destabilising Post ‑Soviet territories, for 
instance by supporting the protests in Belarus or provoking conflicts such as 
the Ukrainian Maidan and the Nagorno ‑crisis, to performing false ‑flag opera‑
tions, including the Skripal and Navalny cases, and even the Malaysia Airlines 
Flight 17 (MH17) disaster over Ukraine.
The narrative concerning the United States, claims that according to the 
American national security strategy, there exists no alternative to the lead‑
ing role of the US globally, and therefore a multipolar world order shall not 
emerge. Therefore, the US needs to defend its interests militarily around the 
globe and cause directed chaos in a number of hot spots worldwide, whenever 
US supremacy gets questioned. The idea of a North ‑South cooperation among 
countries in Central Europe is, of course, nothing new under the sun. The cur‑
rent Three Seas Initiative (TSI), which brings together 12 states across Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Balkans in the area between the Black, Baltic and 
Adriatic Seas can be seen as the modern embodiment of the pre ‑WWII concept 
of Międzymorze (Intermarium) introduced by Józef Piłsudski in the inter‑
war period (Gorka 2018). However, the articles suggest that recent American 
support for the TSI could be key to transforming Euro‑Atlantic relations. The 
construction of the Via Carpathia North ‑South highway and the creation of 
Liquefied Natural Gas infrastructure, with sea terminals in Poland and Croatia 
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connected via pipeline, could advance American interests in the region while 
hindering Russia’s influence. Within the grand scheme of creating a federal 
group of Central European states to counter Russian power and simultaneously 
weaken the EU, Poland is portrayed as a vanguard of American interests, which 
is why Poland’s leadership role in the TSI project is crucial from an American 
standpoint, according to the news pieces.
This brings us to the rationale behind why country ‑related mentions were so 
overrepresented in the case of Polish language articles. The excess of country 
mentions – more than 20% difference compared to other V4 countries – in the 
case of Polish language articles was largely a result of mentions concerning 
Poland itself. Most of the narratives we have identified fed into previously listed 
topics; however, they occurred with a higher frequency, and they focused on 
Poland’s role as a vessel for US interests in Europe and the country’s strategic 
position in a system of Post ‑Atlantism or Neo ‑Atlantism. Poland’s intended role 
within the geopolitical meta ‑narrative would entail the obstruction of Russian‑
‑European energy cooperation. There were several mentions of assumed Rus‑
sophobia among the Polish political elite and the intentional falsification of 
WWII history, along with the war on (Red Army) monuments. The articles showed 
particular concern regarding Poland’s role in the Belarusian protests, stating 
that Polish political elites try to interfere with Belarusian domestic affairs, 
supporting the Belarusian opposition in order to extend Poland’s sphere of 
influence and destabilise the post ‑Soviet region. Another segment of Polish 
language articles introduced a different narrative which we have not found 
in the other datasets. This line of narrative stated that Polish nationals were 
increasingly dissatisfied with their own country’s leadership due to economic 
problems, and that recent pro ‑choice demonstrations in Poland had been, in 
reality, anti ‑government protests, exposing growing political discontent among 
Polish citizens. Articles concerning Poland that originally appeared in the Pol‑
ish language made up 60% of the respective dataset, compared to only 21% of 
articles on the Czech Republic that appeared in the Czech language, 13% on 
Slovakia in Slovakian and merely 3% on Hungary in Hungarian. Regarding 
the latter three, common recurring narratives included threats posed at the 
countries by the European migration crisis and foreign (Western) secret service 
operations, as well as the oppression and economic exploitation of the states in 
the second tier of Europe by Brussels, but we have not identified anti ‑government 
narratives as in the case of Poland. We have, however, identified a unique same‑
‑language country discourse concerning the doubted independence of Czech 
media from foreign influence.
A further instance of overrepresentation in the frequency of mentions of 
a specific country was the case of articles on Ukraine in the Hungarian language 
news. More than one third of the Hungarian dataset contained mentions on 
Ukraine, making it the number one country cited in the dataset (before even 
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the United States and Russia, with 32% and 28% of mentions respectively). 
In comparison, only 17% of Polish, 14% of Czech and 5% of Slovak language 
articles contained news on Ukraine. Common narratives for the four countries 
included the hypothesised role of the United States in organising the Euro‑
maidan, a wave of demonstrations in Ukraine which began in Maidan Nezalezh‑
nosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv, later on followed by the Crimean crisis. 
The supposed rationale of the US was the provocation of Russian involvement 
in the Crimean crisis and ultimately the incitement of economic sanctions 
against Russia as well as nurturing Russophobia in neighbouring countries. 
The MH17 disaster was also linked as a planned incident to punish the Russian 
Federation for the annexation of Crimea. In both the Hungarian and Czech 
language news, the Nagorno ‑crisis has been connected to Ukraine as well, with 
the alleged support of Kyiv to Azerbaijan during the conflict. It was described as 
a gesture to Turkey, an ally of Azerbaijan, for opposing the Russian annexation 
of Crimea. In the Hungarian language news specifically, we found mentions of 
adverse economic and living circumstances in Transcarpathia – the bordering 
Ukrainian region with a significant Hungarian ethnic minority – as well as the 
envisioned disintegration of Ukraine and the annexation of its territories to 
neighbouring countries.
The second most frequently mentioned category on a V4 level was Organisa‑
tion, with 50% of mentions in Slovak language articles, 41% for Czech, 36% 
for Hungarian and 29% for Polish. The top two organisations mentioned for all 
four datasets were the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza‑
tion. The EU was mentioned in 20% of Slovakian, 18% of Czech, 14% of Polish 
and 13% of Hungarian language articles. Common V4 narratives regarding the 
EU included the suspected manifestation of vested American interests behind 
the EU instituting sanctions against Russia – and particularly the Russian gas 
business – as well as an unrealistic fear of Russia stemming from the leaders of 
the European Union. It has been stated multiple times in the articles that the 
EU is not a democratic institution but a club led by Germany or Berlin ruling the 
continent, always in accordance with US interests. Brussels’ role in forcing and 
organising migration to the continent has also been a common V4 narrative as 
well as the exploitation of Eastern European countries by old member states 
and the intentional conservation of a two ‑speed Europe, which is economically 
unbeneficial for newer members and weakens the integrity of Central Eastern 
Europe. The EU was named an imperialistic regime that would soon dissolve, 
as showcased by its inability to deal with the Coronavirus epidemic. Country 
specific narratives regarding the EU were found in the case of Poland and 
Hungary. In Polish language articles, we found references of Poland losing its 
sovereignty to the European Union and claims that recent Polish protests had 
been supported by Brussels in order to remove the conservative political elite, 
who refused to act in line with United States interests. Hungarian language 
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articles contained mentions of EU leaders supporting Ukrainian aggression 
towards Russia.
Mentions of the NATO were present in 18% of Slovakian, 11% of Polish, 
10% of Czech and 9% of Hungarian articles, which presented a consistent 
narrative overarching all four datasets. NATO was described as a Cold War relic 
that is a tool for US interventions around the globe and an ally of the American 
military ‑industrial complex. NATO supposedly continues to see an enemy in Rus‑
sia and, therefore, is preparing for war at Russia’s western borders by deploy‑
ing military bases and equipment in Central Europe and the Baltics as well as 
expanding its operations to countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, 
despite earlier consensuses. Central European states, according to the narrative, 
serve as stationary aircraft carriers of NATO and shall be involved in anti ‑Russian 
provocation. NATO, therefore, is a threat to the national security of Central Eu‑
ropean states, as according to the articles, these countries would be sacrificed 
by Western powers in a (nuclear) confrontation with Russia.
The third most important organisation in terms of frequency of mentions 
was the Islamic State (ISIS), which has been cited in 13% of Slovakian, 8% of 
Hungarian and 5% of Czech language articles. Interestingly, only 1% of Polish 
articles cited ISIS. We could not identify a cohesive narrative, except for the 
United States being behind the creation or supporting the Islamic State. How‑
ever, the alleged reasons for doing so varied from hindering the peace process 
in Syria in order to destabilise the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
and trying to destroy Europe by fuelling the migration crisis, to buying cheap oil 
from ISIS, with Turkey and the NATO acting as intermediaries. Further organi‑
sations mentioned in the articles with an average of 1–4% frequency included 
the CIA, the FBI, ‘the West’, ‘NGOs’, the United Nations, the White Helmets 
and the ‘Deep State’. These organisations did not carry a particular narrative, 
but were rather mentioned in connection to previously described discourses, as 
a reinforcement regarding theories on alleged underground operations.
The category Concept has been established to be able to identify narratives 
around phenomena that cannot be linked to one particular event, specific coun‑
try or geography, but hold significant importance in constituting narratives. 
Such concepts have been mentioned in 36% of Czech, 33% of Hungarian, 21% 
of Polish and 20% of Slovak language articles. ‘Terror’ has been the number 
one concept for the Hungarian, Slovak and Czech language datasets, with a rela‑
tively consistent distribution of mentions, at 16%, 15% and 11% respectively. 
In Polish language articles, terror was not among the top three concepts, with 
merely 1% of mentions. The prevailing narrative around ‘terror’ in all datasets 
concerned the United States allegedly managing global terrorism, and recent 
terrorist attacks in Europe being staged. The supporting arguments and ration‑
ale for the account remain unclear, except for the supposed desire of the US 
to exercise power around the globe and further its geopolitical strategies. The 
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Hungarian dataset, in particular, contained a number of mentions on ‘terror’ 
in the context of Ukraine. However, we could not establish a specific narrative 
in this case, as the term ‘terror’ and ‘terrorist’ have been used to describe both 
a pejorative propaganda term allegedly used by the Ukrainian leadership to label 
pro ‑Russian separatists, as well as to denote the Ukrainian regime as a form of 
state terrorism itself. Juxtaposing the different meanings, we have concluded 
that the mentions on ‘terror’ in the context of Ukraine in Hungarian language 
articles, albeit numerous, were mostly used as a tool to express offensive lan‑
guage and no clear narrative could be established from it.
‘Migration’ was mentioned in 11% of Hungarian and 10% of Czech news 
pieces, making it the second most frequently cited concept in the two languages, 
while we have found only one pertinent article in the Polish and Slovakian data‑
sets. The focus was on the European migration crisis, which was described as 
a planned operation of the United States in order to undermine the European 
Union, transform its demographics and eventually destroy European culture. 
The articles contained references to the economic burden of supporting refu‑
gees, the prospects of refugee family reunification and deteriorating crime rates 
in Western Europe. In comparison, the second most frequently cited concept 
in Polish and Slovak language articles was ‘information war’, with 4% and 5% 
of mentions respectively, mainly referring to anti ‑Russian propaganda and at‑
tempted falsification of WWII history performed by the ‘the West’. Distinctively, 
the number one concept for Polish language articles was ‘gas’ with 5% of men‑
tions, which was not a frequently cited concept in other datasets. The emphasis 
again was on Poland’s strategic position in advancing American economic inter‑
ests and pushing Russia out of the European gas market, feeding into previously 
mentioned narratives. The Skripal and Navalny cases were linked to the matter, 
as well as claimed CIA involvement in them. ‘Coup d’état’ was another mutual 
theme, with 2–4% of mentions, ranking third or fourth place among concepts 
in Czech, Polish and Hungarian news. The articles identified the United States 
as the suspected organiser behind the recent upheavals in Ukraine, Turkey, 
Syria and the Greek coup of 1967 as well as a planned take ‑over of power in the 
Czech Republic and Armenia.
Within the Geographical location category, we have gathered localities that 
do not belong to the Country category because they tend to denote a specific 
location where events have taken place, rather than representing an acting en‑
tity. Geographical locations have been mentioned in 37% of Hungarian, 26% 
of Czech, 22% of Polish and 15% of Slovakian articles. The top three locations 
mentioned in the four datasets were Europe; Eastern Ukraine and Crimea; and 
the Middle East. The narratives around ‘Europe’ included both narratives on 
the European Union and on Europe’s geopolitical situation (vis ‑à‑vis the United 
States) that have already been described above. The term ‘Europe’ has been used 
rather freely in the articles to refer to both the continent, the people of Europe 
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and the European Union, which is why mentions of ‘Europe’ as a geographic 
location is difficult to strictly outline.
The Middle East was cited in a relatively high percentage of Hungarian and 
Czech language articles, with 14% and 11% of mentions respectively, while it was 
quoted in only 5% of Slovakian and 1% of Polish language articles. Narratives 
on the Middle East were consistent among datasets. The American involvement 
in the Syrian civil war was portrayed as an instance of directed chaos, which is 
supposed to be a tool to justify the presence of the United States as world police in 
the region. Whereas, according to the articles, it is indeed the US who is behind 
supporting terrorists in the Middle East with the help of the White Helmets, 
a volunteer organisation of Syrian civil defence. It was stated that while Russia 
propagates peace, American interests lie in maintaining an impenetrable zone of 
conflict even at the price of risking the outbreak of a third world war. We found 
a unique line of narrative in Czech language articles that stated that the Euro‑
pean Union is preparing the establishment of a European Empire, which would 
spread to North ‑Africa and the Middle East, which is why European leaders 
are supposedly facilitating migration to Europe from countries in the region.
References to Eastern Ukraine and Crimea were found in 15% of Hungar‑
ian, 5% Polish and 4% of Czech news pieces, while no relevant mentions were 
identified in Slovakian articles. Common narratives emphasised the democratic 
legitimacy of the 2014 Crimean status referendum, assessing the local popu‑
lation’s political will whether Crimea should join the Russian Federation as 
a federal subject. It was also expressed that ever since its annexation to Russia, 
Crimea supposedly enjoyed greater infrastructural and economic development 
than the rest of Ukraine, and could provide better quality of life for its citizens. 
This piece of information was presented as evidence regarding the assumption 
that sanctions against Russia due to the Crimean Crisis had been purely based 
on excuses. In Czech and Hungarian language news, we found mentions of sup‑
posed groundworks of planned NATO bases in the Donbass region of Ukraine, 
specifically in Sievierodonetsk and Mariupol, with the aim of threatening Crimea 
and the Russian Federation itself. In Hungarian articles, Crimean events were 
linked to the Nagorno ‑Karabakh Conflict, with an expected Ukrainian ‑Turkish 
alliance against Russia and the support of the Crimean Tatar autonomist ethnic 
minority by Turkey.
The category Ideologies and Beliefs has been established jointly, as the articles 
convoked ideological and religious beliefs in similar contexts. They were pre‑
sented as governing world views that can explain certain events and underlying 
motivations both in domestic affairs and international relations. Ideologies and 
religions were mentioned in 30% of Polish, 23% of Slovakian, 19% of Czech 
and 17% percent of Hungarian articles. ‘Russophobia’ came up as the most 
often cited ideology in Polish, Czech and Hungarian language news with 18% 
and 6–6% of mentions respectively, while it reached second place in Slovakian 
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articles with 8% frequency. A sentiment of increasing Russophobia was cited 
in connection to a previously mentioned geopolitical meta ‑narrative of Neo‑ or 
Post ‑Atlantism, and the economic sanctions introduced against Russia after the 
Crimean Crisis. The media campaign against Russia concerning the Navalny 
case, as well as inferred censorship efforts of Russian news sites on American 
social media platforms were linked to anti ‑Russian attitudes as well. Russopho‑
bia was described as a form of xenophobia and intentional dehumanisation of 
a group of people because of their nationality. Russophobia was a very important 
meta ‑narrative in constituting the general world view expressed by the articles. 
It was connected to the falsification of WWII events, destruction of Red Army 
monuments, and the retrospective portrayal of Russia as an aggressor in the 
Second World War. Russophobia, along these lines, was linked to Nazism, the 
second most cited ideology with 10% of mentions in Polish and Slovak language 
news and 4% percent frequency in Czech and Hungarian articles. ‘The West’, 
the European Union and Ukraine were all labelled Fascists or Nazis in their ad‑
versarial tendencies with Russia. Russophobia and Nazism were co ‑mentioned 
as two sides of the same coin.
In comparison, ‘Islam’, the third most frequent topic in the category was 
featured only in 5% of Slovakian, 3% of Hungarian and Czech and 1% of Pol‑
ish language articles. It was referred to in relation to the migration crisis, as 
a threat to European culture. Other ideologies mentioned included ‘multicul‑
tural’, ‘open ‑society’, ‘gender’, ‘capitalist’, ‘democratic’, ‘socialist’ and ‘anti‑
‑establishment’, albeit with a very low incidence. The gap in the frequency of 
mentions among Russophobia and Nazism contrasted with all other ideologies 
cited showcases where the dominant dividing lines lie according to the meta‑
‑narratives outlined by the news pieces.
Person ‑related narratives were featured with a noticeably lower frequency 
than narratives concerning nation states or organisations. This underlines the 
inherent geopolitical thinking behind notions unfolding from the narratives and 
meta ‑narratives uncovered above. The Person category reached 19% of mentions 
in Czech, 13% in Hungarian, 12% in Polish and 8% in Slovak language arti‑
cles. Articles featuring renowned people tended not to carry specific storylines 
related to the persons quoted, but rather, individuals mentioned were linked 
to previous narratives and allocated to the righteous or sinister side of events, 
as an indication of their character, or more precisely of how they were intended 
to be portrayed. It is also interesting to note that those news pieces that were 
more openly citing conspiracy theory ‑like ideas were overrepresented in this 
category. In Czech, Hungarian and Polish articles, Vladimir Putin consistently 
ranked among the top people quoted, with 3–4% of mentions. The Russian 
president was described as someone whose main aim is to protect peace, while 
being under constant threat from foreign powers and secret services as well as 
a victim of bad publicity directed towards him from international media. Among 
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American politicians, we predominantly found mentions of Hillary Clinton, Ba‑
rack Obama and Donald Trump, albeit with a generally lower frequency of below 
3%, and with no mentions in the Slovakian dataset. While all three politicians 
were linked to some extent to furthering American geopolitical strategies with 
potentially devious tools, President Trump was occasionally also portrayed as 
someone open to establishing friendlier relationships with Russia, though he 
is unfortunately controlled by the ‘Deep State’. Polish president Andrzej Duda 
were mentioned uniquely in Polish language articles, with a comparable fre‑
quency of mentions to President Trump, at 2% within the respective dataset. 
President Duda was linked to Poland serving US and NATO interests in Europe. 
George Soros received a noticeable share of mentions in Slovakian, Hungarian 
and Czech news, with 5%, 3% and 2% respectively. Soros’ name was brought 
up in relation to non ‑governmental organisation activities in Europe, report‑
edly supporting anti ‑establishment protests in Central Europe and managing 
organised migration. Angela Merkel received 1–3% of mentions across the four 
datasets, mostly referring to American geopolitical grand strategy in Europe. 
Alexei Navalny was mentioned in the Czech, Hungarian and Polish datasets 
with 1–2% frequency, in relation to the poisoning being faked with possible 
CIA involvement, in order to create an atmosphere of international distrust 
towards Russia.
Events or occurrences have been cited with the lowest frequency among all 
categories, with 27% of Polish, 12% of Hungarian, 9% Czech and only 3% 
of Slovakian articles. This tendency underlines the logic of unfolding meta‑
‑narratives that mainly focus on actors in the international arena and their 
general, rather static stances towards each other. This gives little attention to 
passing events and expresses a logic of Cold War ‑like frozen conflict, where 
animosity seems constant. Nevertheless, we have found some distinct tenden‑
cies among countries, with the Second World War as an event being overrepre‑
sented at 20% of mentions in Polish language news, compared to 1–3% in the 
other three datasets, and the MH17 disaster cited with a salient 9% frequency 
in Hungarian articles, compared to 0–1% in other languages. Both of these 
themes respectively account for the higher share of events mentioned in Polish 
and Hungarian language news. A common occurrence brought up in the Polish, 
Czech and Hungarian datasets, albeit with a fairly low frequency of 2–4%, was 
the Coronavirus epidemic. The relatively low rate of mentions is, of course, also 
due to the fact that references to the Coronavirus appeared only in 2020, while 
articles in the dataset include news pieces starting from 2015. Articles on the 
COVID‑19 pandemic mostly focused on the inability of the European Union to 
deal with the epidemic that puts an end to 500 years of global domination of Eu‑
rope. The dissolution of the European Union was envisioned following the crisis 
caused by the pandemic. There were references to attempts in worldwide media 
to create bad publicity for the Sputnik V vaccine developed in Russia as well as 
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to undervalue international aid provided by Russia to other countries during 
the crisis. The creation of the Coronavirus itself has been occasionally linked 
to the United States, according to the narrative, as an attempt to defame China.
Narratives and Meta ‑narratives
By systematically examining the narrative structure outlined by the thematic 
analysis of the close to one thousand news pieces examined, using frequency 
analysis and mapping relationship structures among topics, we were able to 
uncover not only overarching narratives but also meta ‑narratives unfolding 
from the articles that were present in multiple datasets. Meta ‑narratives pro‑
vide larger explanations to individual narratives and construct a big picture 
view of the world organised around questions concerning power relations, 
political order, ideological divisions, historical consciousness and cultural 
identity. They play an integrative role in structuring individual occurrences and 
socio ‑economic contexts into a universal pattern of understanding that can 
shape people’s views and attribute meaning to their subjective experiences. As 
Jankowicz (2020) points out, the most successful narratives in disinformation 
campaigns are the ones that are grounded in ‘truth’ – whether objective facts or 
perceived realities of life – as they can effectively sow doubt, distrust and discon‑
tent in targeted groups of society. While country ‑specific narratives identified 
in the disinformation news pieces aimed at distinctive vulnerabilities, such as 
historical remembrance of WWII events in Poland, views on Ukrainian nation‑
alism in Hungary or media independence in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
overarching meta ‑narratives sought to weaponize emotions exploiting fissures 
in general attitudes and cultural identity of V4 countries.
As described in Table 3., we have identified 5 meta ‑narratives that united 
16 standalone narratives in an umbrella ‑like fashion that were reinforced by 
about 25 supporting discourses. The five meta ‑narratives identified were: (1) 
growing Russophobia in the West; (2) the preparation of a war against Russia 
by the US and NATO; (3) the United States seeking global hegemony; (4) the 
establishment of a system of Post‑/Neo ‑Atlantism by dividing Europe; and (5) 
the envisioned collapse of the European Union. Meta ‑narratives used polarising 
framing to play on deep ‑rooted issues like V4 nations’ preference for a strong 
NATO presence in the continent, the legacy of Soviet geopolitical dominance in 
Eastern Europe and its interplay with Euro ‑Atlantic relations, or the Visegrád 
countries’ position on economic sanctions against Russia. We can also recog‑
nise emphasis on potential pain points around the economic centre ‑periphery 
relationship and balance of power among the Franco ‑German EU core and 
newer member states, as well as the debate on moving toward a less integrated 
Europe with stronger nation states and emerging regional alliances. Meta‑
‑narratives recognisably used these existing cultural ‑historical references as 
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Table 3.: Narratives, meta‑narratives and supporting discourses identified 
from the thematic analysis
Meta‑narratives Narratives Supporting discourses
GROWING 
RUSSOPHOBIA
• Falsification of WWII history 
events
• Destruction of Red Army 
monuments
• Disinformation campaigns 
directed by the US to defame 
Russia
• Anti-Russian sentiments growing in 
neighbouring states
• Ukrainian involvement in Nagorno-crisis
• Turkey supports Crimean Tatar 
autonomy
• Czech media is being influenced by the 
CIA
• Navalny and Skripal cases were staged
THE US AND 
THE NATO 
PREPARE FOR WAR 
WITH RUSSIA
• Crimean crisis was provoked 
intentionally
• NATO bases being established 
in Central and Eastern Europe
• Destabilisation of the CIS 
region
• Ukrainian Maidan organised by the CIA
• Legitimacy of the Crimean referendum
• Living conditions in Crimea have 
improved
• MH17 disaster was a false flag operation
• US wants to get hold of Russia’s natural 
resources





• A multipolar world order 
cannot emerge
• The US wants to keep Russia 
in isolation
• The US wants to destroy 
Europe
• The US wants to defame 
China
• The US manages global terrorism
• Hot-spots of US intervention around the 
globe
• The US organises coups against 
democratically elected governments
• The US and the NATO buys oil from the 
ISIS
• Organised migration supported by the 
US 
• Coronavirus invented by the US
POST- / 
NEO-ATLANTISM
• American support for the TSI 
project
• Poland is a vanguard of 
American interests
• Fight over access to the 
European gas market
• North-South belt of Central European 
States to divide the continent
• Polish involvement in Belarusian affairs
• Skripal and Navalny cases fabricated to 




• The EU is unable to deal with 
the COVID-crisis
• Two-speed Europe
• EU leaders support organised 
migration
• Brussels bureaucracy hinders member 
states
• The EU is a club led by Germany
• Economic exploitation of newer member 
states
• Central European states loose 
sovereignty
• Western culture is under attack
Source: Own elaboration
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 17 (2021) 2 189
groundworks to communicate a grand scheme of affairs that reaches beyond the 
Central ‑European region. The five meta ‑narratives described a coherent system 
pertaining to a world view that follows a very much Cold War ‑like logic, with 
the long ‑standing ideological animosity between two great powers, the United 
States and the Russian Federation being the most important defining tendency 
in the current state of global affairs. All other ‘circumstantial phenomena’, such 
as the dismantling of the European Union, the war in the Middle East, the 
migration crisis, the Coronavirus epidemic essentially somehow play into the 
meta ‑narrative of a frozen but now reheating conflict, where everything hap‑
pens for a reason that can be linked to the geopolitical motives and ideological 
convictions of great powers luring in the background.
According to the meta ‑narratives, the United States seeking global hegemony 
seems to be the root cause of Russophobia being fuelled in the West, that can 
serve as rationalisation for the intentional isolation of Russia, and in the longer‑
‑term war against Russia led by NATO. Meta ‑narratives point at a divide ‑and‑
‑conquer strategy employed by the US in the European continent, through the 
establishment of a Post‑/Neo ‑Atlantist system that would inevitably entail the 
break ‑up of the European Union, and at the same time present an opportunity 
for the creation of an anti ‑Russian stronghold in Central and Eastern Europe. To 
illustrate the interplay among topics, we have generated a network displaying 
pro ‑Kremlin disinformation narratives affecting the V4 countries, which seeks 
to visualise the connections between the most important meta ‑narratives and 
narratives that create a system of mutually reinforcing storylines.
While we have no evidence to assume any coordination of efforts or clearly 
defined motivations behind narratives being communicated through possibly 
pro ‑Kremlin disinformation news sources in the V4 region, it calls for further 
investigation to uncover what benefits could be attributed to the spread of these 
particular narratives and meta ‑narratives in relation to the Visegrád Countries. 
Overall, the framing of events, even if it mostly employs a victim narrative (e.g., 
Russophobia), calls attention to Russia’s grandeur as the sole true enemy of the 
most powerful country in the world, the United States. We could argue that it 
also seeks to plant seeds of discontent and suspicion among citizens of V4 coun‑
tries, in some cases toward their own country’s leadership (e.g., in the case of 
Poland), toward their neighbouring countries (e.g., in the case of Hungary and 
Ukraine) and in general toward the leadership, institutions and older member 
states of the European Union. Finally, it also questions the motives behind the 
grand strategy of the United States in the continent and the long ‑term faith of 
the Central European region as hypothetically devised by the US. To appreciate 
the significance of disinformation narratives being planted via computational 
propaganda, further research directions should focus on uncovering the actual 
effects that these narratives have on people’s perceptions and attitudes in the 
V4 region, and how it might be possible to combat such effects.
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Conclusion
Selective exposure to news content facilitated by modern digital technologies 
has the potential to drive people toward more extreme attitudes and increase 
the polarisation in our societies (EPRS 2019a; Rosůlek 2018; Sunstein 2007). 
As automation and algorithms become more embedded in day ‑to ‑day life, we 
must make sure that we can maintain our capacity to establish a general con‑
sensus on questions pertinent to a healthy functioning of democracy (Sunstein 
Figure 1: Network of potential pro‑Kremlin disinformation narratives 
in the V4 region
Source: Own elaboration
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2007). Disinformation and purposeful deception work through the unwitting 
participation of individuals who readily accept and share content that seeks 
to influence based on instinctive emotions instead of rational arguments or 
scientific facts (Bastos – Mercea 2018). If we can identify tools of storytelling 
used to create powerful messages to incite certain group behaviour and aggra‑
vate existing societal grievances, perhaps we will be better equipped to protect 
ourselves from malevolent disinformation campaigns intentionally targeted to 
create discord (Jankowicz 2020; Rosůlek 2018). The Visegrád Group has man‑
aged to profile itself internationally as a significant collective actor (Cabada – 
Waisová 2018), and as such, should expect to become the target of disinforma‑
tion campaigns aimed at manipulating public opinion. Within the scope of this 
study, we have employed a sophisticated research design on a large amount 
of textual data, using a natural language processing algorithm to examine the 
frequency and relationship between recurring topics in disinformation news 
pieces and identify overarching narratives and meta ‑narratives communicated 
through them. By analysing close to one thousand disinformation news pieces 
from more than 60 different online sources that originally appeared in the 
languages of the V4 countries, collected by the EUvsDisinfo database (2020a), 
we were able to identify consistent narratives and meta ‑narratives that feed 
into a coherent system of beliefs. We have uncovered 5 meta ‑narratives: (1) 
growing Russophobia in the West; (2) the preparation of a war against Russia 
by the US and NATO; (3) the United States seeking global hegemony; (4) the 
establishment of a system of Post‑/Neo ‑Atlantism by dividing Europe; and (5) 
the envisioned collapse of the European Union. These meta ‑narratives were 
constructed through 16 standalone narratives and supported by around 25 
individual discourses. While we cannot assume coordination or intentional‑
ity behind the narrative structure unfolding from the news pieces analysed, 
further research might be able to unveil the potential consequences of what 
could be understood as a possible endeavour to create discontent and suspi‑
cion among citizens of the V4 countries toward the current European political 
and economic system, particularly the European Union, and the stance of the 
United States and NATO in the continent. Information warfare is a powerful 
geopolitical tool that could negatively affect any Central European state or 
the European Union itself, and it remains a challenge to protect our societies 
from it. The evaluation of the effectiveness of such disinformation campaigns 
in transforming citizens’ attitudes calls for further research, including how 
education plays a part in improving critical thinking and providing tools for 
people to recognise intentional disinformation patterns.
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